He never made it back.
His vehicle struck an Improvised Explosive Device. The colonel and six of his soldiers died at the scene, killed not in the heat of battle, but in the deliberate, calculated silence that followed it.
A Two-Stage Kill
Troops of Sector 3, Joint Task Force (North East), had come under an insurgent infiltration attempt at Charlie 13 location in Monguno, Borno State, in the late hours of April 12. The soldiers engaged the attackers in a fierce gun battle, eventually forcing them to retreat and securing the perimeter.
But the withdrawal was a ruse.
As the dust settled and the Commanding Officer moved forward to assess the situation, his convoy rolled over a pre-planted IED, a weapon that had been quietly waiting in the earth long before the first shot was fired.
Security analyst and counter-insurgency expert Mubashir Adamu told THE WHISTLER the pattern is unmistakable.
“What we are seeing is a two-stage ambush strategy. The initial attack is designed to draw troops into a response, while the IED is pre-positioned along the most likely route of advance. The intent is specifically to eliminate leadership,” he said.
“When you lose a CO at that level, you don’t just lose a man but you lose institutional knowledge, unit cohesion, and operational momentum.
“ISWAP understands this. They are deliberately targeting commanders to create confusion and slow down military operations.”
ISWAP which broke away from Boko Haram in 2016 following ideological disputes over the killing of civilians who has over the past decade transformed from a rag-tag splinter faction into arguably the most sophisticated jihadist organisation operating in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Unlike its predecessor under Abubakar Shekau, which relied heavily on suicide bombings and mass civilian targeting, ISWAP has pursued a calculated dual strategy: cultivating local populations through taxation and social services, while deploying increasingly precise military tactics against security forces.
The group controls significant swathes of territory across the Lake Chad Basin, with strongholds in the Sambisa Forest, the Tumbus islands on Lake Chad, and the Bindul-Jilli axis in Gubio Local Government Area of Borno State at the same corridor that has been at the centre of military airstrikes in recent days.
By most estimates, ISWAP commands between 3,500 and 5,000 fighters, with a fluid logistics network spanning Borno, Yobe, and parts of Niger and Chad.
The IED as a Weapon of Strategic Attrition
The use of IEDs is not new in the Northeast theatre. Since 2011, improvised explosive devices have claimed more Nigerian military lives than any other single weapon system deployed by insurgents.
In January 2026 alone, an IED attack along the Bindul-Gubio axis killed eight soldiers moving from Gubio towards Damasak, an incident the military cited as one of the triggers for the April 11 airstrike on Jilli market.
A 2023 report by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) documented over 1,200 IED incidents in the Lake Chad Basin between 2020 and 2023, with Nigerian security forces accounting for the majority of fatalities. The Northeast remains the most IED-dense theatre in West Africa.
What has changed, analysts said, is the sophistication of deployment.
“ISWAP has moved from opportunistic IED placement to deliberate command-targeting,” Adamu explained.
“They study movement patterns, they know post-engagement procedures, and they exploit the predictable human instinct of a commander to go forward after a fight. This is not random. This is studied.”
A Week of Blood
April 12 deaths did not occur in isolation. The Monguno ambush is the latest in a concentrated wave of ISWAP activity that has shaken the Northeast over the past week alone.
On April 9, coordinated attacks were recorded simultaneously in Ngamdu and Benisheik, that led to the death of Brigadier general Braimoh.
