When 744 former terrorists and victims of violent extremism marched out of the Federal Government’s De-radicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration camp in Gombe on Thursday, they became the latest chapter in a story Nigeria has been telling itself for nearly a decade, that bombs and bullets alone cannot end the insurgency that has ravaged the North-East.
The ceremony, held under the auspices of Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), was both a celebration and a statement of doctrine. Chief of Defence Staff General Olufemi Oluyede, represented by Rear Admiral Kabiru Tanimu, made the government’s position explicit: “Lasting peace can only be achieved when we address the underlying drivers of de-radicalisation, disengagement and reintegration.”
But as the applause faded in Gombe, a more uncomfortable question hung in the air one that analysts, researchers, and affected communities have been asking since the programme launched: is it working?
The Numbers Tell Part of the Story
The 744 graduates are drawn from 17 Nigerian states and four neighbouring countries, with Borno accounting for 597 nearly 80 per cent of the total cohort a figure that reflects the state’s status as the epicentre of the Boko Haram conflict. Yobe contributed 58 graduates, Kano 15, Bauchi 12, and Adamawa 10.
Eight foreign nationals from the Niger Republic, Chad, Cameroon, and Burkina Faso were also among the graduates, underscoring the transnational dimensions of extremism in the Lake Chad Basin.
Since its establishment, Operation Safe Corridor has rehabilitated approximately 2,190 repentant terrorists and reintegrated them back into society, built around five pillars: disarmament, demobilisation, de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration.
Thursday’s 744 graduates represent a significant single-batch addition to that cumulative figure.
The programme is a restricted custodial initiative through which approximately 900 ex-combatants passed in its first years since 2015, before scaling significantly.
The curriculum encompasses psychosocial support, vocational training, religious reorientation, educational reform, civic education, and behavioural transformation a holistic model designed to address the ideological, psychological, and economic conditions that fuel radicalisation.
The Strategic Logic
Programme Coordinator Brigadier General Yusuf Ali acknowledged that not all those who passed through the programme were ideologically committed fighters.
Many, he said, were coerced. “Some were abducted, others were forced, and many were drawn into the conflict due to circumstances beyond their control,” he said a point that underlines one of the most difficult classification challenges the programme faces: distinguishing between willing combatants and victims of circumstance.
The Nigerian government adopted Operation Safe Corridor in a bid to de-radicalise, rehabilitate and reintegrate former Boko Haram combatants who voluntarily surrender to the government, in recognition of the limits of military strategy.
Studies have demonstrated that terrorism cannot be defeated solely by military force, with analysts arguing that non-military strategies are seen as a more viable means of eradicating terrorism’s fundamental causes and achieving a long-term peaceful end.
The International Crisis Group has noted that Operation Safe Corridor reflects Nigerian authorities’ growing recognition that they cannot beat Boko Haram by military means alone, and that the programme has had some success — providing an incentive for Boko Haram recruits to defect from a fight that many considered futile.
The Fault Lines
Yet for all its strategic soundness, the programme has never been without controversy and the concerns are substantial.
While the programme has been relatively successful in the North East region, concerns have been raised about recidivism, with reports of some rehabilitated individuals returning to terror groups.
Community resistance remains a persistent obstacle. Most residents of the affected communities oppose the resettlement of so-called repentant terrorists in the communities they had terrorised in the past without any form of punishment.
This sentiment has been so strong that it has, at times, blocked the practical reintegration of graduates, rendering the programme’s final and most critical phase effectively stalled.
The lack of a legal framework, issues of public perception and trust, and host communities’ reluctance to accept former Boko Haram combatants have undermined successful implementation of the programme.
Research has also flagged design flaws. A study found that Operation Safe Corridor tends to mix Boko Haram defectors and released Boko Haram captives for screening, which provides opportunity for further radicalisation within the programme itself.
The same study noted that this, combined with human rights concerns and inadequate management, has resulted in donor dissatisfaction and eroded public confidence in the programme’s effectiveness.
