As usual, I am an ordinary citizen. And, like many Nigerians, I remain naturally optimistic and hopeful about the possibilities of a better tomorrow, even if such hopes are not always realised. Hope is part of our national character. We endure setbacks, yet continue to believe renewal is possible.
But optimism must never become a substitute for reality. It must be tested against evidence, performance and outcomes. It is from that standpoint that I reflect on the future of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) and what it means for Nigeria.
Few institutions matter more to the Nigerian state.
Recent developments underscore just how strategic energy institutions can be when they are properly conceived and executed. The emergence of the Dangote Refinery, despite its well‑known challenges and controversies, has already altered Nigeria’s energy calculus. At a time of heightened global supply disruptions, volatile geopolitics and constrained refining capacity across multiple regions, the commissioning of a large, integrated domestic refinery has begun to reduce Nigeria’s exposure to external shocks, ease pressure on foreign exchange and improve fuel availability. Its impact, even at partial operations, illustrates what competent capital mobilisation, clarity of purpose and scale can achieve for national energy security. It also serves as a reminder that institutional performance, not intent, is what ultimately reshapes outcomes.
NNPCL sits at the centre of public finance, foreign exchange earnings, energy security and investor confidence. For decades, petroleum revenues have sustained federal and state budgets, financed imports and provided the fiscal oxygen on which the government depends. Agriculture no longer carries the economy as it once did. Manufacturing remains weak. Non‑oil exports are still too small. In practical terms, Nigeria remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbons.
That is why the future of NNPCL is inseparable from the future of Nigeria.
When the current leadership team, led by Group Chief Executive Officer Bayo Ojulari, and the board chaired by Musa Ahmadu‑Kida, assumed office, many expected a decisive break from the past. The hope was that a commercially run company, backed by the Petroleum Industry Act, would finally emerge from the ruins of bureaucracy, opacity and political patronage.
I shared that hope.
After observing developments over the past year, however, I have become less optimistic and more cautious.
The issue is not personalities. It is structural.
Nigeria has attempted to create a modern national energy company while preserving an old political control model. That contradiction lies at the heart of NNPCL’s difficulties. In theory, NNPCL belongs to Nigerians. In practice, Nigerians can only exercise ownership indirectly through the state. Effective governing authority rests largely with the presidency, which appoints ministers, directors and senior executives. The result is layered ownership, centralised power and diffused accountability.
Such a model rarely produces transformational institutions.
Boards struggle to exercise independent authority when ultimate political power lies elsewhere. Management teams find themselves constrained by political calculations, competing interests and administrative caution. Commercial logic often yields to state expediency. Decisions that should take weeks can take months. Problems that should be solved commercially become prolonged disputes.
No serious company can thrive under those conditions.
This helps explain why many of the operational weaknesses associated with the old NNPC remain visible in the new NNPCL.
Joint ventures remain less effective than they should be. Technical and financial service agreements are not always managed with sufficient urgency. Asset optimisation remains slow. Internal coordination appears weak. Cost discipline is uneven. A culture of delay still competes with the need for delivery.
The greatest tragedy is that Nigeria is not suffering from a lack of resources. It is suffering from underperformance.
Several producing assets continue to illustrate this failure. OML 18, OML 24, OML 42, OML 123 and OML124 are examples often cited in industry discussions as assets whose potential has not been fully realised. Some remain constrained by evacuation challenges, unresolved commercial disputes, infrastructure limitations or management bottlenecks.
These are not geological failures. They are governance failures.
An oil‑producing nation with Nigeria’s reserves should not be struggling to maximise already discovered and producing assets. Such matters ought to be resolved through competent negotiation, decisive leadership and disciplined execution.
