Reactive counter-terrorism posture risks entrenching armed groups in a new corridor linking northwest to southwest Nigeria.
Mass killings, abductions and roadside bombs in recent weeks point to a dangerous escalation of violent extremism in the Borgu-Kainji axis along Nigeria’s western borders with Benin and Niger. These are not isolated events.
In early February 2026, the Sadiku wing of Boko Haram’s Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS) faction attacked Woro and Nuku villages in Kwara State’s Kaiama Local Government Area (LGA). This followed the community’s refusal to embrace the terrorists’ doctrine. Around 170 people were killed, and many others were kidnapped. It is the single deadliest event in an area where helpless communities have faced repeated attacks.
In response, President Bola Tinubu announced Operation Savannah Shield and deployed an army battalion to Kaiama. Within days, Konkoso, Tunga-Makeri and Pissa communities in Borgu LGA of Niger State were attacked, with over 30 people killed.
Sites of recent attacks in northwest Nigeria
These incidents are part of a wider pattern of escalating violence across the Borgu-Kianji axis, spanning Borgu and Agwara LGAs in Niger State, Kaiama and Baruten LGAs in Kwara State, and Bagudo, Yauri, Zuru, and Ngaski LGAs in Kebbi State.
The Kainji Lake National Park is at the centre, with poorly governed forest corridors and long-neglected rural communities linking Nigeria’s northwest and southwest to the Benin-Niger borderlands.
Violent events involving jihadist groups in the region rose by 86 per cent from 2024 to 2025, while deaths increased by 262 per cent. In November 2025, terrorists conducted two mass abductions targeting schoolchildren in Kebbi and Niger communities. In March 2026, roadside bombs detonated in Woro and along the Luma Road in the Niger-Kwara border area.
Nigeria’s current approach remains largely reactive and narrowly focused on single locations. Operation Savannah Shield’s limitation to Kaiama highlights this limited mindset. It does not address the moving and regional nature of the threats.
For example, as Sadiku-JAS faced aerial strikes from the military and clashes with bandits around its previous Shiroro base, there should have been a pre-emptive analysis of where the group might expand next. Instead, responses have lagged behind the group’s shift into the Borgu-Kainji forests.
The pattern of bomb attacks echoes JAS-Sadiku’s Shiroro operations and larger JAS’s tactics in the Lake Chad Basin, and points to the possibility that the Sadiku wing may have established an improvised explosive device production facility inside the Kainji park. This would represent a major leap in capability.
The group could begin laying defensive minefields across key access routes and make ground operations high-risk for Nigerian forces. This scenario fits Boko Haram’s known tendencies, aiming to secure sanctuaries where they can build logistics, generate income and prepare for sustained offensives.
Both the Sadiku wing and larger JAS headquartered on Lake Chad’s islands are operationally networked, with pathways for arms and fighter reinforcements flowing from headquarters, and ransom and extortion funds flowing back.
Understanding this relationship is critical to assessing the risk, particularly regarding JAS’s financing and how the terrorists might be adapting tactics used in Lake Chad to Borgu-Kainji.
Three dynamics make Borgu-Kainji particularly vulnerable to Lake Chad scenario risks. First, terrain – poorly governed forests, waterways and porous borders – provides good cover for mobility, training and supply lines. Such terrain offers escape routes and hard-to-reach sanctuaries, similar to Sambisa Forest and Mandara Mountains in the Lake Chad Basin.
Second, multiple armed groups now operate in overlapping spaces, including the JAS-Sadiku group, al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), filtering in from northern Benin, Lakurawa,saru-Mahmuda, an early Boko Haram splinter. This mix overwhelms and complicates security operations.
The Institute for Security Studies research also points to cooperation and co-production of violence by the groups, particularly Sadiku-JAS and Lakurawa.
Third, illicit economies act as powerful multipliers. Terrorists tax logging and small-scale artisanal mining, much like Boko Haram profits from fishing in the Lake Chad Basin. Added to ransom payments and extortion of communities, these revenue streams fund weapons acquisition and recruitment, and help purchase local cooperation.
If these dynamics continue unchecked, the axis could become a stable base for armed groups, serving as a gateway to the more stable southwestern Nigeria and coastal West Africa. That could shift attention and resources away from Lake Chad, further complicating national and regional security priorities.
There is still a narrowing window to prevent this outcome. This requires moving from a reactive posture to a preemptive one. Operation Savannah Shield should be re-scoped into a more comprehensive regional campaign covering the entire Borgu-Kainji axis, similar to Operation Hadin Kai in the Northeast region.
The campaign must target networks and prioritise a sustained offensive posture rather than the static defence characterising much of Nigeria’s current operations.
President Tinubu should set a time-bound, results-based mandate for commanders to avoid a repeat of the open-ended, resource-draining campaign in Lake Chad. At the same time, kinetic efforts must be combined with governance improvements, expanding state presence through services and accountability to enhance local resilience and deny terrorists the vacuum they exploit for recruitment and control.
Security forces must also target the terrorism-financing mechanisms evolving in the axis, and crack down on criminal control of logging and mining. Given the transnational dynamics of the threats, progress will depend on cross-border cooperation with Benin and Niger, regardless of strained political relations.
The lesson from Lake Chad is that violent extremism and terrorism can take root in predictable ways and endure where state response is reactive. In Borgu-Kainji, these patterns are already emerging. The question is whether Nigeria, and its equally threatened neighbours, act early and decisively enough to break them.
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
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